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CAN THERE BE A JUST RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT?  
Dov Ronen 
   
I may have first thought about "just resolution of conflict" when I was a student at the Hebrew 
University in Jerusalem many years ago. Those days I often heard on the radio--there was no TV 
in Israel at the time--and read about King Hussein's repeated calls for a "just and lasting Peace" 
in the Middle East. I have also noticed over the years that the same slogan has been repeated, not 
only by King Hussein, but also by other prominent and less prominent leaders in regard to other 
conflicts.(1) The notion of just resolution of conflict has attracted me more and more, especially 
over the years in regards to my study of Africa.  
This attraction has resurfaced while doing some research and writing recently on ethnic diversity 
in Central Europe, including the recent conflict in former Yugoslavia (Ronen, 1997). Indeed, it 
was my recent work in Central Europe that prompted me to take the slogan "just and lasting 
peace" seriously, try to clarify the phrase "just solution," or "just resolution" in the context of 
conflict, and speculate on its possible application in practice.(2)  
In spite of my inclination to get on with the research, I still hesitated to go public with an 
approach that had "just" in its title and rendering justice as its explicit purpose. One of the 
reasons for this reluctance was my awareness that probably all those concerned with the 
resolution of conflict have always been aiming at a just resolution of conflict.(3) Thus, I had no 
doubt that references in existing scholarly approaches to "fairness" and "acceptability to the 
parties concerned" implied, if not explicitly stated, "justice."(4) A "just resolution" may have also 
been intended in perhaps all formal negotiations and in government policies aimed at preventing 
conflict, even by the United States government in Bosnia Herzegovina.(5) I have also been 
persuaded that one of the scholars' and practitioners' reasons for shying away from the words 
"just" and "justice" may have been the often stated dictum that "what is just for one may not be 
just for the other," which is difficult to refute. Another very likely reason for refraining from the 
explicit use of "just" for an approach may have been, that the phrase "just resolution of conflict" 
sounds utopian, naive, and unrealistic which, I think, is also unrefutable.(6)  
All these reasons seemed to be fairly good excuses, perhaps good reasons as well, to put aside 
my inquiry into the just resolution approach. In any case, I hesitated to publicly propose such a 
notion.  
Then, a few months ago I attended a presentation given by Larry Susskind of MIT at a seminar 
of the Program for International Conflict Analysis and Resolution (PICAR) at Harvard 
University's Center for International Affairs. Susskind prefaced his own thesis with the 
expression: "What if..." That expression, "what if," seemed to me to project a degree of 
hesitation, and appeared to contain an appeal for deliberation and experimentation which, I 
realized then, is what I also wanted to imply in my proposed approach.  
Feeling encouraged by this newly found way of conveying reservations, I discussed with a few 
friends my "just solution approach."(7) After hearing reactions which I rightly or wrongly 
considered quite encouraging, I have decided to dare to suggest: WHAT IF we were to set out to 
discuss and try to experiment with an approach to resolution of conflict with the word "just" in 
its title and in which the rendering of "justice" is its stated aim?(8)  
Before I turn to discuss my specific propositions, I should specify at the outset what I think the 
just resolution approach might accomplish.(9) I have come up with five points:  
First, the use of the phrase "just resolution of conflict" would make explicit a notion which has 
been implicit anyhow in at least some conflict resolution approaches and perhaps in many 
practical attempts as well. More precisely, the use of the term "just" would place a morally 
accepted notion in the forefront.  
Second, the use of the phrase "just resolution of conflict" would juxtapose an unquestionably 
high moral policy objective with what I consider to be important but morally inferior objectives, 
such as the serving of various interests and foreign policy considerations.(10) The important but 
morally inferior objectives would not necessarily be discarded--they could hardly be in the "real 
world"--but they could fall under greater scrutiny in light of the moral notion of justice.  
Third, the mere use of the morally acceptable phrase itself, "just resolution of conflict" in the 
approach, might affect, effect, enhance, and produce morally acceptable outcomes.  
Fourth, the use of the phrase "just resolution of conflict" could legitimate the use of such means 
as international sanctions, threat of force, arm-twisting, and payoffs to political leaders, for the 
enforcement of compliance with a just resolution.  
Fifth, the use of the phrase "just resolution of conflict" could more easily lead to what Herbert 
Kelman calls "cooperative functional arrangements," and more clearly imply an intention to find 
a long lasting resolution of conflict (Kelman, 1996: 504). This proposition is based on my belief 
that a just resolution of a conflict could enhance cooperation, and be a long lasting resolution; 
other attempts could merely set the stage for conflict management.  
I might add here the hope, as a sixth point, that possible future deliberations and experimentation 
with the "just resolution of conflict" approach would be looked at quite favorably by foundations 
and the "international community" as a serious research undertaking of a purportedly new 
approach to the important task of conflict resolution and conflict prevention around the world.  
I shall now turn to the approach itself, which has two main components. One component of the 
approach is a largely technical one. It concerns suggested formalities and content of the 
discussions between two parties to a conflict and of the role of third party observers in them.(11) I 
shall discuss this component very briefly in the first part of my paper. The other component of 
the approach, the second and longer part of my paper, is the theoretical one. In the third part of 
my paper I shall make a connection between the technical format and theory.(12) I should also 
state at the outset that there is no attempt here to review the literature. The intent of this paper is 
to outline a purportedly innovative approach and provoke reactions to it.  
Formalities and Content  
Perhaps the only a priori requirement I would stress in regard to the formalities is that the 
participants from both sides to a conflict be specifically invited to discuss a possible just 
resolution of the conflict. The discussions would be attended by third party observers. It might 
also be useful to highlight in the invitations the two parties evident, and perhaps frequently 
stated, desire to reach a just and lasting peace between them.(13)  
The discussions would be divided into two distinct segments, each with a different purpose. The 
invited parties to the conflict would be challenged to address two different issues, in two 
separate, sequential steps. First, they would be invited to state, or summarize, WHAT their party 
to the conflict might consider to be a just resolution of that specific conflict (or perhaps of any 
conflict). Second, they would be invited to explain to each other--and to the third party 
observers--WHY they consider their proposed resolution, or perhaps any resolution, just.(14)  
It seems to me very likely that during the first challenging step, during the presentations of 
WHAT might be a just resolution, the content of the discussion would not be different from the 
content of any other type of discussions, at least in their initial stages, in that (a) the parties might 
do no more than reiterate their respective interests, positions and demands; (b) the parties might 
come up with extreme and mutually exclusive views. It is in the second step, during the 
discussions of WHY the resolution they proposed should be seen as just, that I assume the 
content of the discussion, and the role of the third party observers, would be to a considerable 
degree different from the content of discussions in other approaches.  
The reason for the considerable difference is that in the second step the parties are not challenged 
and expected to better understand each other, or to gain each others' confidence, or to come up 
with a mutually satisfactory solution to the conflict. They are challenged to point to and elaborate 
on the principle of justice as they see it.(15) Even if the content of the second step is expected to 
be different from the content of discussions in other approaches, it is not expected to be less 
confrontational. It is quite likely that both parties would offer not normative but historical 
justifications, relate past behavior of the other side, plead for retribution for grievances, and the 
like.  
The third party observers have basically four tasks to perform. Their task during the first step 
would be to list the just resolutions proposed by the two sides. Their second task would be to 
record the respective explanations of the list of just resolutions. Their third task would be to 
assess the gap and the possible overlap between the explained just resolutions on the one hand, 
and the just resolution concept conveyed in the theoretical model elaborated further below, on 
the other hand. The observers' fourth task, and the most important one, is to try to guide the two 
parties toward the propositions outlined in the theoretical model, i.e., toward their realization that 
a just resolution of their conflict should reflect the requirements outlined in the model.  
That much about the formalities and content for the moment and that too is only tentative. 
Although I shall say a bit more on procedural matters further, all its aspects, including the 
scheduled duration of each segment, should be assessed in light of past experience with other 
approaches, several in-house discussions and experimentation with the proposed one.  
The Theoretical Component of a Just Resolution of Conflict  
My intention in this section is to present a summary of my thesis as succinctly as possible and 
expose it to constructive criticism and suggestions for revisions.(16) Methodologically, there will 
be only scant references to the literature. I shall merely follow a line of thought that leads from a 
brief exploration of the cause of conflict to a statement about its just resolution.  
Focusing on the cause(s) of conflict will be the first step, for it is my belief that any theory or 
proposition regarding the resolution of conflict must be based on a theory, or proposition, on the 
cause(s) of conflict. A theory offered in regard to the resolution of conflict without reliance on a 
theory regarding its cause(s) is analogous to a medication given to the poorly understood cause 
of the common cold. The inverse is also true: the poorly understood cause of the common cold, 
or of conflict, can only produce unreliable medication to either or both. Accordingly, I shall start 
with a statement on the relationship between a poorly conceived cause and effect relation, first 
with a reference to a widely held belief, then with an example from recent history.  
What are not the Causes of Conflict?  
A widely held popular belief about the origins of conflict, which influences the thinking of 
scholars and practitioners, is that mere differences among human beings, or groups, are the cause 
of conflict. There is no evidence to substantiate the belief that differences cause conflict.(17)  
On the other hand, the evidence that differences in themselves do not cause conflict is plentiful. 
Human beings of various ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic and other backgrounds (and 
civilizations!) have lived alongside each other in various parts of the world. So did Bosnian 
Serbs, Croats and Muslims in South-Eastern Europe, Hutus and Tutsis in Africa, Tamils and 
Sinhalese in South-East Asia, Palestinians and Israelis in the Middle East, Irish Protestants and 
Catholics in Western Europe, and French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians in North 
America. The ethnic, religious and various other types of differences do polarize groups in 
already erupted conflict, but the cause of conflict must be sought elsewhere.  
Unfortunately, in my judgement, many scholars have found that "elsewhere" in the recent events 
of the end of the Cold War. As ethnic conflicts have proliferated since the end of the Cold War, 
so have the number of scholars and practitioners theorizing about them. Many among these 
scholars and practitioners have drawn a seemingly logical cause and effect relationship between, 
on the one hand, each of the three unexpected events which have been tightly connected to the 
end of the Cold War and, on the other hand, the subsequent eruption of ethnic conflicts.  
1. The ending of a specific form of political repression due to the collapse of communist regimes 
(producing a host of "weak states"), has been seen by many as causing a release of previously 
repressed ancient, pre-modern, ethnic hatred.  
2. The end of the ideological and military confrontation during the Cold War has been at least 
implicitly assigned as a cause for the eruption, the beginning, of new types of confrontations, 
including ethnic conflict.  
3. The unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, in turn, is seen to be an obvious 
cause for the resurgence of ethnic and national aspirations.(18)  
The three types of phenomena that have occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War--the end of 
the bi-polar Cold War confrontation, the curtailment of communist repression, and the collapse 
of these two entities are historical facts. The relationship between these three events connected to 
the end of the Cold War, including the subsequent process of democratization, on the one hand, 
and the eruption of conflict, on the other hand, is obviously sequential, but not necessarily 
causal. In any case, whatever degree of causal relationship may exist between any of the Cold 
War related events and the eruption of specific conflicts, there is no good reason to deduce from 
those relationships a general theory on the cause of conflict, ethnic or otherwise.  
Nor is there a good reason to deduce a general theory on the cause of conflict, ethnic or 
otherwise, from conflicts waged in recent years in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Canada, 
Rwanda and elsewhere. Each of these conflicts, as well as conflicts waged prior to and after 
World War I in Europe, and in Africa and elsewhere in previous centuries and in the present one, 
occurred in specific historical circumstances which may only provide clues as to the specific 
factors that contributed to their eruption.  
A general theory of conflict cannot be drawn from history. The number of cases we could draw 
from would necessarily be limited and their interpretations skewed. Conflict between and among 
human beings, alone or in groups, is an universal phenomenon that transcends time and space. So 
the cause of conflict is likely to be universal as well.(19) My hypothesis about the cause of 
conflict purports to be universally applicable, for it is extrapolated from studies of human 
psychology, nature and needs.  
The Probable Causes of Conflict  
A central component of conflict, I propose, one of its core causes, is the perception of threat, 
danger, or fear.(20) Another, separate, central component of conflict may be the desire to remove 
the threat which is commonly vested in an "other," be it an individual, a group, or a government. 
In case of ethnic conflict, or any other group conflict, there may be still a third central 
component: the political entrepreneur or leader, who engages in mobilization of human beings 
against the "other," the perceived source of the threat. Thus, I propose, conflict is the by-product 
of an effort, "my" or "our" effort, to reduce or eliminate a perceived threat by somehow 
neutralizing, overcoming, or even eliminating "them," the ones responsible for the threat. To put 
this into a single complex sentence in regard to group conflict:  
Any type of group conflict erupts if and when a number of human beings are successfully 
mobilized by political entrepreneur(s) against an "other," for the purpose of removing a 
perceived threat to "us."  
Several other components may also be identified in addition to the three listed above. They 
would include (a) the activation of a shared identity by members of a mobilized group, (b) 
polarization of characteristics and past deeds between "us" and "them," (c) the indispensable 
awareness of one's (human) right to be free from the "content" of the threat, and (d) the very 
notion of "perception," which may or may not reflect reality. Including these and additional 
elements as well, here is the thesis in one long and complex sentence:  
Group conflict occurs if and when human beings are successfully mobilized by political 
entrepreneur(s), ("leaders") who, conveying to them their (human) rights and a presence of a 
threat to them, are also successful in bringing them to activate a shared identity in a polarized 
opposition to the identity of those responsible for the threat--may be a government, another 
group of human beings in a state, or in another state--in order to remove the perceived threat.  
To illustrate the dynamic interaction:  
 
Three comments should be added. First, all the components of the causes of conflict are 
proposed to be the same in all group conflicts, be they ethnic, religious, national, social class, 
economic class, gender, generational, interstate, or any other. (In inter-personal conflict only the 
activation of a shared identity is presumed to be absent.) Second, although neither ancient 
hatreds, centuries old hostilities, nor ethnic, religious, gender, cultural and any other differences 
cause conflict, any of the above can accentuate polarization between two entities and render the 
conflict between them (more) violent. Third, and perhaps most importantly, human beings, not 
groups, perceive, activate, are mobilized, and so on. The human being is the participant in 
conflict and all components of the cause of conflict pertain to him/her. To the discussion of this 
issue we now turn.  
The Human Being as a Unit of Analysis  
Herbert Kelman has noted that ". . . although war and peace, and international relations as a 
whole, are societal and intersocietal processes, which cannot be reduced to the level of individual 
behavior, there are many aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution for which the 
individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis." (Kelman, 1996: 503). From my 
perspective, the human being represents the most appropriate unit of analysis, with all 
reservations removed. In other words, the individual human being represents not only "the 
appropriate unit of analysis" but the exclusive unit of analysis.  
It is not groups that perceive a threat or participate in conflict; human beings do. Ethnic and 
religious groups, nations, states, minorities, or cultures do not perceive, make decisions, vote, 
live, declare wars, participate in revolutions, fight and die in wars, sign peace treaties, and enjoy 
the fruits of peace. Individual human beings do. Marx made a crucial error of judgment in 
assuming that workers of the world would become aware of their "true" identity as the 
proletariat, perceive their acute oppression by the owners of the means of production, and hence 
would unite and engage in conflict (revolution) against their capitalist exploiters. We should 
learn from Marx's historic mistake and not replicate it in regard to other presumed groups.  
Fear is felt personally and may be expressed and acted upon collectively by those who do fear. 
War and peace, and all other types of inter-state and intra-state relations, are societal and 
intersocietal processes, but they are conducted by human beings. However insistently the claim 
is made by the powers that be, the sense of personal security of the individual human being is not 
and should not be seen as synonymous with the "national security" of the state in which those 
individuals live.  
That human beings sharing the same ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, national, or any other 
background, feel and act the same way is perhaps true on a very high level of metaphysical 
generalization but not in reality. In reality, not all human beings who share the same ethnic, 
religious, racial, linguistic, national or any other background necessarily proclaim the same self-
identity(21) in all circumstances, nor perceive a threat, or the same threat; nor necessarily do all of 
them feel a compulsion to act, or act the same way, against a threat in all circumstances--not all 
Corsicans, all Tamils, Croats, Palestinians, or Americans.  
Nor is there evidence for a unanimous verbal or moral support for "the cause" on any side of an 
ethnic, religious, class, or international conflict. It has not been so in the conflict among the 
Serbs and Muslims, among Hutus and Tutsis, Palestinians and Israelis, nor was it so among the 
peoples of the various states that participated in history's innumerable wars.  
As an example from recent history, the notion of the Bosnian-Serb and Bosnian-Muslim conflict 
encompassing, as it were, two peoples in conflict, is a correct statement in the abstract but not in 
fact. Many individuals from both groups of people considered themselves Yugoslavs and have 
not regarded human beings with different ethnic backgrounds in the former Yugoslavia as the 
"other."  
True enough, in case of heightened tension, in the former Yugoslavia and anywhere in the world, 
such as in the case of ethnic cleansing, terrorist attack or war, there would be a sense of solidarity 
with "the cause" on either side. But even solidarity gained in such instances might fluctuate with 
changes in the intensity of the conflict.(22)  
Every effort should be made not to lose sight of the fact that the human being is the proper unit 
of analysis in conflict. This issue leads us to an examination of human needs.  
   
Human Needs  
As the human being is the unit of analysis, so human needs refer to personal needs. John Burton 
has noted: "Problem-solving at the social level . . . is possible only by processes that take the 
needs of the individual as the basis for analysis and planning." (Burton, 1979: 79). Johan 
Galtung, in turn, has made the following remark: "Our concern is with human needs, and by that 
is meant needs that are located, if not necessarily perceived, in individual human beings. The 
need-subject is an individual..." (Galtung, 1980: 60).  
Each human being possesses his or her needs, as well as his or her own aspirations, wants, and 
dreams. A specific human being is hungry, or homeless, feels safe, or feels satisfied, or feels 
free, in every part of the world, including those from non-western cultures. The phrase 
"individual needs" has nothing to do with western cultural, or perhaps capitalist, individualism. 
Hunger was individually felt in primitive tribes thousands of years ago, the same as by the 
homeless on a New York street today. Attributing needs to socially, politically or economically 
defined groups, such as voters, soldiers, consumers, ethnic groups, or citizens of a state, may be 
useful for specific purposes--such as in submitting collective demands for a pay-raise, or for 
providing statistical information in national budgets. But, for understanding the meaning and 
implications of political and economic behavior of human beings and conflict, we have to focus 
on personal needs.(23)  
What are the Needs of Humans? How Many Needs are There?  
In the early 1930s, the Harvard psychiatrist Henry Murray suggested that there are twelve 
"viscerogenic" and twenty-eight "psychogenic" needs of human beings. In Murray's view the 
first twelve needs are primary, the latter secondary (Murray, 1938). Abraham Maslow, the late 
American psychologist, listed a hierarchy of five biologically based needs: (1) Physical needs 
(water, food, sex, etc.); (2) Safety; (3) Love, affection, belonging; (4) Self-esteem; and (5) Self-
actualization. (Maslow, 1943: 370-396). James Davies, a political scientist, after revising 
Maslow's list by eliminating the second category of safety, asserts that "all these [four] basic 
needs are organically, genetically programmed predispositions" (Davies, 1977: 161).  
The most cogent discussion of human needs and human nature I have found is in The Evolution 
of Civilizations, by the historian Carroll Quigley. (Quigley, 1979). According to Quigley, needs 
are the range of dynamic requirements of the human organism to develop potentialities, which 
are the range of static abilities of the human organism. "Drives," argues Quigley, transform 
potentialities into needs. In other words, human needs are the dynamic aspect of potentialities. 
The number of potentialities, or needs, is difficult to establish, writes Quigley, for some 
potentialities "blur into one another," while some conflict with others, and still others substitute 
for one another in practice. (Quigley, 1979: 54). In addition, writes Quigley, "needs" in one 
category at times overlap, or are in some way interconnected with, another need in the other 
category, such as, for example, physical sex and emotional love. Quigley notes that due to these 
complications one could divide the range of human potentialities and needs into "forty or into 
four hundred divisions or levels." Nevertheless, he lists two basic "range[s] of human 
potentialities or human needs," the one physical, the other psychic, under which all other human 
needs cluster.  
From Quigley's thesis I have extrapolated that each human being has two types, or two sets, of 
needs as I call them: a set of psychological (or psychic, or emotional) needs and a set of physical 
(or material, or economic) needs. Each set of needs includes a long list of specific needs of the 
human organism. The set of physical needs includes the needs for the physical survival and well-
being of the human being, such as food, water, shelter, touch, medical care and the need to be 
free from the opposites of all the above, such as death and bodily injury, hunger, homelessness 
and illness. The set of psychological needs includes the needs for the psychological survival, and 
well-being, of the human being, such as a sense of belonging, love, respect, appreciation, 
friendship, and the need to be free from the opposites of all the above, such as hatred, disrespect, 
and alienation.(24)  
Although all human beings have the same two sets of needs, the quality and quantity of each 
specific need of each human being varies from person to person. Also, the specific ways the 
various needs may be satisfied and the specific resources that may satisfy various needs may 
vary from person to person and from one cultural setting to another. Above all, and most 
importantly, both sets of needs are requirements of the human organism for survival and, beyond 
survival, "well-being." My needs for food, water, as well as some form of social interaction, 
love, freedom from repression, are not merely my desires and aspirations; my body (and my 
psyche, if your wish) needs them in order to survive and function as a fully-human being. One 
might put the same in various and perhaps more accurate ways. The noted philosophers 
Mortimer Adler and Johan Galtung, for example, make a clear distinction between "needs" and 
"wants," the former being natural desires, the latter acquired ones.(25)  
Maslow and Davies are among the scholars who assume that there is a hierarchy of needs. I do 
not concur. There may be personal prioritizing in different circumstances and contexts. At times 
food from one set of needs may be deemed by some to be first in importance to freedom from the 
other set of needs, or vice versa. Similarly, there may emerge a personally preferred hierarchy 
within each set, such as food preceding shelter in one set; love may precede self-esteem, in the 
other. I am siding with Galtung, who writes:  
In most literature about needs there is an explicit or implicit assumption of a general hierarchy of 
needs... Any such thesis is dangerous because it limits the range of possibilities that should be 
opened by any good theory of needs . . .Thus, the idea that nonmaterial needs are 'higher' than 
material needs can be seen as a way of legitimizing the position given to intellectuals in many 
societies...(26)  
And further:  
... the argument is not against having priorities in concrete situations--all of us have--but against 
any theory of needs that tries to universalize the priorities, freezing them into a general law, 
thereby decreasing the diversity (Galtung, 1980: 70).  
A Just Resolution of Internal Conflict  
Here then is my proposition, which is extrapolated from my interpretation of the cause of 
conflict: The resolution of group conflict is only possible through the elimination of the 
perceived/actual threat. This may be achieved by addressing either of two components of the 
causes of conflict: either preventing/outlawing the rise of political entrepreneurs, or the banning 
opportunities for mobilization. (Without them, groups could not be formed and identities could 
not be activated.) Although the elimination of either is possible in the abstract, in a modern world 
guided by democratic principles both are practically unacceptable. More specifically, the rise of 
political entrepreneurs and possibilities of mobilization may be eliminated in authoritarian 
regimes including colonial rule, but not if democratic rule prevails. A third possible way to 
eliminate a perceived or actual threat in the modern world under democratic rule is through 
negotiated compromise, concession and the like which, basically, recasts, reformulates, and/or 
reschedules the satisfaction of needs.(27) Ultimately, the use of this method may produce an end 
to violence, and might lead to management of a conflict, but not likely to produce its resolution, 
let alone its end.(28)  
A just resolution of conflict, prevention of conflict, and perhaps the attainment of lasting peace 
as well, requires the elimination of the perceived or actual threat to the satisfaction of the 
relevant items in either or both sets of needs of human beings in the respective populations 
involved in conflict. In other words: satisfaction of the needs of human beings is the just 
resolution of conflict, the only morally acceptable one, and the only one that may also last. To 
illustrate:  
   
   
                                        A Just Resolution of Conflict 
 
The practical measures required to satisfy needs of human beings may differ according to the 
type of group membership.  
My hypothesis is that the needs of human beings in such groups as gangs, and various other 
relatively small groups in conflict--such as the once based on activated political, economic 
interest, religious, racial, and gender identities--may be satisfied through the prompt and 
effective implementation of economic and social policies that produce need-satisfying political 
and economic conditions for the members of such groups within the state. ("Policies" refers to 
laws and regulations concerning the allocation of material resources, and/or implementation of 
human or civil rights, etc.) If that practical measure is used, perception of the threat will likely to 
disappear, activation of a shared identity will cease or diminish (perhaps replaced by new ones), 
and the conflict will be reduced, resolved, or ended.  
However, if ethnic or national identities are activated by large and territorial groups, the 
formulation and prompt and effective implementation of such policies might not suffice. In many 
if not all such cases the satisfaction of psychological needs (for a sense of belonging, freedom 
from perceived repression, first class citizenship, and the like) may require structural change. In 
other words, in such cases there might arise the demand for, and the necessity to implement, 
some form of autonomy, or federal/con-federal arrangement--or secession. Here lies a serious 
dilemma for a theory of conflict resolution.  
The Option of Secession  
Secession, the separation of a piece of territory and population from an existing state, is one 
possible way of ending conflict, or a way to prevent it. So it was in the case of the secession of 
Bangla Desh, the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and in the former Czechoslovakia. 
Nevertheless, secession is not commonly considered as an option in resolution and prevention of 
conflict by scholars, at least not too openly, and ignored by governments. It is a largely 
untouchable issue in conflict resolution both in theory and in practice.(29)  
Some of the possible reasons for this situation are the widely shared belief that secession "opens 
Pandora's box," that secession in one case may have a "domino effect," and that loss of 
population, resources, and so on, would negatively effect the original social or political entity. 
None of those have apparently occurred in any of the cases where secession occurred, especially 
not in the recent secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia. Ethiopia lost territory and population, but 
negative effects of the secession are not apparent. Perhaps the opposite.  
There may be a far more significant reason than the ones cited, perhaps a more accurate 
explanation for the reluctance to consider secession as a legitimate option. The reluctance may 
be due to a moral commitment of students of conflict not only to resolution of conflict, but also 
to restoring, or maintaining a social order which, ipso facto, implies the safeguarding of the 
(territorial) integrity of the social or political unit threatened by conflict. To put it differently, 
conflict prevention is conceived by scholars and practitioners alike to perform the supposed 
"morally correct" task of sustaining an assumed "need" for social harmony within the already 
existing social or political unit, more specifically, within the sovereign state; the resolution of an 
already erupted conflict, in turn, is conceived to perform the supposed morally correct task of 
restoring social harmony in the sovereign state.(30)  
This simultaneous, perhaps equally strong moral commitment to both prevention and resolution 
of conflict and to the "survival" of a given social or political entity puts an undue restraint on the 
process of conflict resolution. More accurately, the moral commitment to the preservation of the 
existing social or political entity puts undue restraint. In any case, there cannot be a strong moral 
commitment to the satisfaction of human needs, alongside an equally strong moral commitment 
to the "survival" of a given social or political entity. It seems evident to me that a prior moral 
commitment is necessary for the just resolution or prevention of conflict, through the satisfaction 
of personal human needs--and to the formulation of policies that promptly and effectively 
produce such a result. A moral commitment to the "survival" of a political entity without 
assuring the satisfaction of both sets of relevant human needs does not lead to a just resolution of 
conflict but, perhaps, to a temporary suspension of conflict and to management of conflict.  
A moral commitment to a just resolution of conflict requires a recognition that secession may 
resolve a particular conflict. It requires a recognition that creation of a new social or political 
entity through secession in search for the satisfaction of both sets of human needs is the moral 
and functional equivalent of appropriate policy formulation and implementation.(31) Satisfaction 
of personal needs does not require the "survival" of an existing social or political entity; it 
requires the survival of human beings. It requires conditions in which both sets of human needs 
may be satisfied.  
It may be useful to consider that secessionists aspire for a new independent and sovereign state 
for it being a means of escaping of being, perhaps, unjustly ruled by "them" in the existing state. 
If that is so, taking secession into account for a just resolution of conflict should not be excluded. 
This is not a recommendation for secession for the resolution of conflict; it is a recommendation 
to formulate and implement measures that satisfy human needs.  
   
   
Connecting Between Formalities and Theory  
In discussing the formalities and content I proposed that the official or unofficial representatives 
of parties to a conflict be challenged to do two things, in two distinct steps. First, be challenged 
to state, or summarize, WHAT their party to the conflict might consider to be a just solution of 
that specific conflict, or any conflict. Then, as the second step, both parties are asked to explain 
to each other--and to the third party observers--WHY they consider their solution just.  
The tasks of the third party observers were described as follows: (a) to list and identify the 
various just resolutions proposed by the two sides, (b) take account of the respective 
explanations of the list of just resolutions, (c) assess the gap and possible overlap among the 
explained just resolutions outlined by each side. I also noted that the task of the third party 
observers would also be (d) to assess the gap and possible overlap between the just resolutions 
outlined by each side and the theoretical model, i,.e, to detect references to personal human 
needs.  
The critical questions are: how could third party observers identify references to human needs in 
the participants' discussions of interests, demands, claims and complaints? how could third party 
observers sort out references to the specific human needs that are perceived threatened by human 
beings in their respective populations?  
I suggest considering the option of, first, setting up a four-partite classification. The first two 
items in the classification pertaining to needs; the second two items pertaining to the policy, or 
structural changes required to satisfy needs. Second, I suggest to try to classify the long list of 
terms mentioned by the participants into each of the four considerably distinct categories. Here is 
the four-partite classification:  
1. psychological/psychic needs;  
2. physical/economic needs;  
3. policy/structural changes that may be required to satisfy psychological/psychic needs, and;  
4. policy/structural changes that may be required to satisfy physical/economic needs.  
As to the classification of the long list of terms mentioned by the participants, among the terms 
that might be used by discussants that belong to the list of psychological needs (and also to the 
unlisted category of political conditions) are: democracy, repression, discrimination, political 
stability, freedom, identity, consensus, sense of personal security, flag, reconciliation, 
citizenship, sovereignty, and self-determination.  
Among the terms that might be used by discussants that belong to the list of possible policy or 
structural changes (3), for satisfying primarily psychological needs are the measures pertaining 
to items listed above, as well as independence, autonomy, secession, cantonization.  
Among the terms that might be used by discussants that belong to the list of physical/economic 
needs (2) (and to the category of economic conditions) are: employment, high standard of living, 
medical care, food, having a shelter over one's head, physical safety.  
Among the terms that might be used by discussants that belong to the list of possible policy or 
structural changes (4) for satisfying primarily physical/economic needs are the measures 
pertaining to items listed above, as well as foreign aid, nationalization/privatization.  
The same lists may be used for sorting out human needs-related items gathered from opinion 
polls, referenda, journalists reports and, possibly, intelligence data.  
All in all, my assumption is that listing of words in terms of needs might be a useful tool for 
outlining a proposed resolution of a conflict that is based on the satisfaction of needs of the 
human beings in the population concerned, hence for a just resolution of that conflict.  
   
   
Conclusion  
Parties to a conflict (especially those from different culture/value traditions) do not likely share, 
nor could they agree upon, a more or less universal conception of justice. But, WHAT IF--we 
were to try to construct, and experiment with an approach to resolution of conflict with the word 
'just' in its title? WHAT IF--we were to embrace the satisfaction of the two sets of needs of 
human beings in populations engaged in conflict as the key to a just resolution of conflict? A 
conception of justice based on the satisfaction of the two sets of needs of human beings in a 
population may have a chance of being accepted as a feasible way of resolving and preventing 
conflict.  
I fully realize that some will reject the approach itself out of hand. There may also be those who 
will disagree with some or many of my specific propositions regarding the just resolution of 
conflict. All those tending to agree that a just resolution approach may have a place among the 
various approaches are invited to suggest revisions to improve it.  
*  
As food for further thought on the subject, I would like to conclude with a few pertinent 
propositions, which we might want to think about:  
 Participants in a conflict do not primarily aim at winning; their aim is preventing the 
"other" from winning. For if the "other" wins, the threat to the satisfaction of needs would 
continue. 
 Human needs are needs of the human organism; they are personal needs. Thus conflict, 
essentially, is not against "them," it is for "me." 
 Neither "we," nor I, consider "them" to be the "enemy" because of what they are, but 
because of what "we," or I, perceive "them" to do, or threaten to do, to "us," hence to me. 
 Long-lasting peace is possible only if the perceived absence of threat to the satisfaction of 




1. The words "just" and "justice" also appear in various declarations, especially regarding human 
rights, and mentioned by a long line of philosophers, Aristotle, Kant, and Rousseau among them. 
The two principal recent works on justice I have consulted for this paper are John Rawls (1971), 
and Morton Deutsch (1985).  
2. About the reason for the new attraction to the issue suffice it to say that I have found the 
Dayton Peace accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina lacks virtually any semblance of a "just solution." 
For a similar assessment see for example, Miller (1996). For an excellent account of the conflict 
in former Yugoslavia see Woodward (1995). An interesting discussion in regard to unjust Peace 
Treaties at the end of World War I may be found in Bailey (1944: 295ff.)  
3. For a brief discussion of the various approaches to conflict see Pruitt and Olczak (1995).  
4. John Rawls notes the difference between the adjectives "fair," "mutually acceptable," on the 
one hand, and "just," on the other hand. He writes: " ... 'justice as fairness'... conveys the idea that 
the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation ... is fair. [However, it] does not mean 
that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same, any more than the phrase 'poetry as 
metaphor' means that the concepts of poetry and metaphor are the same." Rawls (1971: 12-13).  
5. On the other hand, it seems to me that the explicit use of the word "justice" was reserved in the 
context of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia for the legal persecution of the accused either of 
crimes against humanity or genocide.  
6. It may or may not be appropriate to note here that the word "peace" is widely used. It either 
does not sound utopian, naive and unrealistic, or the word is used nevertheless, because we have 
become accustomed not to ask for a precise definition of the word and have wily-nilly accepted it 
sufficient to mean absence of war? (In any case, if one is ready to strive for a peaceful world why 
not for a world in which justice prevails?)  
7. They included initially Larry Susskind, Kevin Clements, Nadim Rouhana, and Barbara 
Sullivan, to whom I hereby extend my thanks.  
8. The idea first appeared in print under the title "Just Solution Approach to Resolution of 
Conflict: Dov Ronen's Call for Reactions," (Ronen, 1996: 17).  
9. I am referring to both conflict resolution and prevention even when I do not mention 
prevention specifically. By "prevention" I refer to policies of governments, international 
organizations and other relevant bodies to prevent conflict.  
10. For a comment on foreign intervention in conflict see Burton (1969: 189-196). While Burton 
refrains from endorsing foreign intervention in a book published in 1969, in the post Cold War 
era the role of international actors is more readily accepted. See also, Sisk (1996).  
11. I shall continue to use the word "discussions," although exchange of views, negotiation, or 
another word may be deemed more, or also, appropriate. Similarly, I shall usually refer to 
"observers" for the third party present at the discussion, although other possible titles, such as 
coordinator, mediator, facilitator, conciliator, may perhaps be substituted. Also, I shall assume 
that more than one observer would be present.  
12. The just resolution approach is intended for both intra-state and inter-state conflict, although 
some details may be relevant for one type and not for the other. Incidentally, the approach may 
also be relevant to conflict within the family, neighborhood, corporations, and so on.  
13. For further details see Burton (1996: 51 ff.)  
14. In practice, the parties must first identify the central issue(s) of the conflict. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that this two-step approach may prove to be more useful in regard to 
discussions of specific issues pertaining to the conflict rather than of the conflict as a whole.  
15. In the approaches that I am familiar with the parties are called to find a common language, 
such as to gain each others' confidence, or find mutually acceptable solutions. See for example 
Susskind & Field (1996: 13).  
16. Elsewhere I have offered more detailed, albeit somewhat different, explanations. Ronen 
(1979; 1997).  
17. A number of scholars seem to share this view. See for example Lake and Rothchild (1996), 
and Glickman, (1995).  
18. For many among these scholars and practitioners the post Cold War era ethnic conflicts 
consisted of the virtual totality of cases from which to extrapolate the causes of conflict. Even for 
scholars and practitioners who have been concerned with conflict since long before the end of 
the Cold War--including political scientists, to whose ranks I happen to belong, and policy-
makers who are called to assess any conflict resolution approach--the post Cold War conflicts 
have provided convenient reference points in their more recent writings and pronouncements.  
19. Not only inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Conflict between spouses, between gangs in 
neighborhoods and others, which may have the same core causes are surely universal.  
20. Most scholars refer to fear which, if it implies a fear from, is essentially the same as threat. 
See reference to fear by Kelman (1996: 505).  
21. In my conceptualization "identity" is far more specific than in the conflict resolution 
literature. See for example, Burton (1996: 30-31). My notion of "activation of identity" may be 
found in Ronen (1979: 8-10ff).  
22. We often read in newspapers as well as in scholarly works about "responsibility of the Serbs 
for much of ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia," "the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in 
Northern Ireland," "the Arab-Israeli conflict," and so on. All these are true in a high level of 
generalization but analytically, for the purpose of the study of conflict especially, they are 
virtually useless notions.  
23. Galtung writes: "The problem is that the term 'need' is also used for nonsubjects; there is talk 
about 'national needs' (for prestige of a country), 'social needs' (e.g., for a good urban sewage 
disposal system), and 'group needs' (e.g., for a place to meet, to be together). The argument here 
would certainly not be that there are no necessary conditions for these social entities or actors to 
function, but that the term 'need' will only be used with reference to need-subjects -- and the only 
subjects we know of in human affairs are individual human beings. It is only in them that the 
'click of correspondence' between need and satisfier can be experienced. That these individual 
human beings develop their need consciousness in a social context and that most of them have 
most of their needs satisfied in a social context does not change the circumstance that groups, 
cities, and countries do not have minds in which needs can be reflected or even articulated. On 
the contrary, the usual experience is ... that such 'collective needs' usually express wishes and 
wants, the desires and demands of the ruling elites in these collectivities, more or less poorly 
disguised." Galtung (1980: 60).  
24. The term "survival" does not only refer to a clinical stage before actual physical and psychic 
death but also to a low level of human functioning. "Well-being" in turn refers to a higher level 
of human functioning.  
25. The distinguished philosopher, Mortimer J. Adler wrote: "Whatever we need is really good 
for us. There are no wrong needs." (Adler, 1985: 124). He also added " . . . all real goods are 
things to which we have a natural right. Our natural needs are the basis of our natural rights -- 
rights to the things we need in order to discharge our moral obligation to seek everything that is 
really good for us in order to lead good human lives. If natural needs were not the same for all 
human beings everywhere, at all times and under all circumstances, we would have no basis for a 
global doctrine that calls for the protection of human rights by all the nations of the earth." 
(Adler, 1985: 127).  
Johan Galtung noted in the same vein: "A need should be distinguished from a want, a wish, a 
desire, a demand." Galtung continues: "The latter are subjectively felt and articulated: they may 
express needs, but they also may not; and there may be needs that are not thus expressed. Thus, 
there is no assumption that people are conscious of their needs. It makes perfect sense to talk 
about the need for freedom of a person born into slavery, knowledgeable of nothing else, just as 
it may make sense to talk about the need for creativity of a person born into the routine jobs of 
"modern' society, knowing nothing else . . . Thus, one aspect of 'need' is tied to the concept 
necessity, which means that we have an image of what is necessary to be human, or at least what 
it is to be nonhuman. Moreover, we shall claim that there is something universal to this image." 
(Galtung, 1980: 59).  
26. Galtung adds: "if it can be ascertained empirically that people in fact do pursue material 
needs first and then nonmaterial ones, even under conditions where they cannot be said to be 
forced to do so, then this is an important consideration." (Galtung, 1980: 67).  
27. For example, in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations the psychological need of Palestinians for 
"freedom" has been recast as "limited autonomy," scheduled to a later date, and so on.  
28. Some scholars explicitly aim for a management of conflict and doubt the possibility of its 
resolution. (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 42). They also state: "Unlike other, more optimistic 
observers, we see no permanent resolutions, only temporary 'fixes.'" (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 
56-57). In my view, management of conflict is acceptable only if conflict is restricted to non-
violent interactions such as competition, rivalry, verbal disputes and the like. Management of 
conflict is not an acceptable goal to aim at in cases of violent or potentially violent conflict. In 
these cases, resolution of the conflict should be the aim.  
29. John Burton does list secession in the context of autonomy: "Secession movements are a 
major symptom of ethnic conflict . . . They could vary from complete independence and new 
sovereignties, to limited control of education and related cultural elements." (Burton, 1996: 18).  
30. The simultaneous commitment to the centrality of human needs and the restoration of 
stability may also be an explanation for the probably unintentional switch from personal needs to 
group needs in the literature on conflict, including conflict resolution, be it the need for identity, 
security, or autonomy.  
31. "Just as with individual biological death, social disintegration may not be necessarily bad; it 
may put an end to something that no longer is viable." (Galtung, 1980: 61).  
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